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INFORMATION REPORT

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SUBJECT: Chinese Communist Policy as Understood
by Minority Party Members

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1. On 18 December 1951, the Farmers and Workers Democratic Party held a small discussion meeting in the house of PENG Tse-min (彭澤民) at which various problems relating to the international and domestic situation and policies for the coming year were discussed. Among the 12 people attending were CHI Fang, HUANG Chi-hsiang, YANG Po-k'ai (楊伯楷), and CHUANG Ming-yuan (莊明遠).
2. CHI Fang expressed his views on Chinese Communist policy in the Korean War as follows:
 - a. The United States has been insincere in seeking a cease-fire agreement because once peace is attained the American Government would no longer have an excuse to make its people prepare for war.
 - b. The United States fears that if a cease-fire agreement is reached, Chinese Communist troops from Korea may menace Taiwan or assist in the liberation of Southeast Asia.
 - c. Once the military phase of the Korean problem is finished, problems would immediately arise which the United States is in no position to solve by political means.
 - d. The Chinese Communists' policy is to see political solutions to military problems, and their final goal is still admittance to United Nations membership, restitution of Taiwan, and a restored partition of Korea.
 - e. The Chinese Communists are unable to bring about an immediate cease-fire in Korea without forcing the Soviet hand in international dealings, but they are unwilling to expand the fighting.
3. PENG Tse-min commented that the Chinese Communists will exhaust every possible political means to solve the Taiwan problem before risking armed invasion. If a Korean cease-fire is arranged, the Chinese Communists are not going to attack Taiwan immediately. If a cease-fire is not attained, an invasion of Taiwan would pose problems of inadequate military strength.

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and USSR policy. Unless the Chinese Communists are sure of full-scale Soviet backing, they will not do anything reckless.

4. Regarding Southern Asia and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), HUANG Chi-hsiang commented that HO Chi-minh, being more nationalistic than communistic, does not enjoy as full Soviet confidence as the Chinese Communists. During the fall of 1951, there was an incipient movement among the Communists to force HO Chi-minh to reorganize his government. Unless something crucial develops, the USSR will give no large-scale aid to HO Chi-minh before they have firmer control over him. Any Soviet aid to the DRV must go through the Chinese Communists. The Chinese Communists will not send troops overtly into Indochina and provoke another Korean situation, but will continue to supply arms and material.

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